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Abstract. The possibility for market participants to place
their bids in markets where they are not geographically located
is investigated in this paper. A framework for managing the
resulting congestion is proposed. The procedure is illustrated
and commented on a test system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The creation of the Internal Electricity Market in Europe
has been subject to lots of discussions in the last years, led
basically by ETSO (European Transmission System Operators)
and EuroPEX (European Power Exchanges) [1]. It seems that
the prevailing mechanism is presently the market coupling
method, where a coordinated market takes place among dif-
ferent markets, using each area’s own rules [2]. First each
sub-market is cleared and then these markets are coupled. The
method is already in use since 2006, coupling the day-ahead
markets of France, Belgium and the Netherlands [3], while it is
to be enlarged to Germany and Luxembourg in 2009 [4]. These
initiatives apply for the moment only in day-ahead markets.
Steps are also taken towards opening intra-day and real-time
markets to foreign participants [5].
In this paper, another way for coupling markets and handling
inter-area congestion is investigated. The approach consists in
allowing participants (generators, large consumers) to bid di-
rectly in any market of the interconnection they wish, without
being obliged to do so via their local operator. Depending on
the time frame, the term “operator” may correspond to a dif-
ferent entity. In day-ahead it is typically the Power Exchange
(PX) while in real-time it is the Transmission System Operator
(TSO). The term Market Operator (MO) is used in the sequel
without distinction. So, the idea is that every market participant
may choose the MO in whose market he wishes to participate.
Were it not for the transmission network constraints, the
above would cause no trouble; every MO would just have
to dispatch the actors who placed their bids in its market.
Obviously these constraints need some treatment and it will
definitely not be enough to have every MO responsible for an
area of the interconnection since this MO may be dispatching
market participants located in another geographical area. Ac-
tually, the assumption made in this paper (market participants
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bidding outside their geographical area) results in the appear-
ance of overlapping markets which should be simultaneously
cleared ensuring at the same time the feasibility of the final
schedule.
In [6], precisely, the author investigates the modeling of this
situation and proposes two iterative algorithms to perform the
clearing sought. The global congestion management problem
is decomposed into a “master problem” (coordination prob-
lem) and several “subproblems” (market problems). In the first
proposed approach, the master problem determines congestion
path prices and the subproblems solve for the individual
market schedules and their own prices. In the second approach,
instead of setting prices for the congested paths, a transmission
coordinator simply allocates the total MW capacities of the
paths to all markets in the master problem. Using allocated
values as the path limits, the market operators solve for the
subproblems.
The approach considered in this paper is similar to the sec-
ond one outlined above in the sense that a central coordinator
is in charge of allocating congested transmission capacity to
the MOs. However, the problem is not treated as a global
market clearing; instead, each market clearing is undisclosed to
other markets. Thus, a different transmission sharing approach
results.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II the situation
described in the Introduction is mathematically formulated.
In Section III the proposed algorithm is presented, while
in Section IV it is applied to a test case. The steps of
the algorithm are explained in some detail and the results
are evaluated. Finally, in the Conclusion, the approach is
summarized and a possible future extension is commented.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
To facilitate the presentation, each MO is assumed to
represent the loads of a certain region and resort to generators
all around the interconnection in order to satisfy its demand.
Let gm be the vector of all generators placing a bid in the
market of the m-th MO, cm the vector of their corresponding
bids and gm their maximum available quantities. Let us also
denote by dm the vector of loads that should be served by
the m-th MO. Each MO will try to minimize the social cost












0 ≤ gmi ≤ gmi (1c)
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2As is typical in such problems, a DC model is used to
represent the network. More precisely, a bus to bus Power
Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) sensitivity matrix S is
used [7]. It refers to the entire interconnection and links line
active power flows to bus active power injections. That is, with
g the vector of total bus generations and d the one of total
bus consumptions, the vector p of line power flows is given
by:
p = S(g − d) (2)
where, in order to come up with the two-dimensional matrix
S, a slack bus has been considered and every bus-to-bus
transaction has been expressed as a pair of two transactions,
one towards and another from the slack bus. The choice of the
slack bus does not affect the computed power flows.
Vectors g and d are computed by adding respectively










where N is the number of the MOs, each of them operating
a market in the interconnection.
Let us call gm the solution of problem (1) solved by the
m-th MO. Assembling together all these solutions, and using
(2)-(4), one easily obtains the resulting line flows p. The case
of interest here is when there are overloaded lines, i.e. pl > pl
or pl < −pl for some l, where pl the maximum capacity of
line l.
III. PRESENTATION OF THE ALGORITHM
A. Overview
This paper proposes an iterative algorithm to deal with the
congestion management problem. Its principle consists in a
gradual incorporation into the MO market clearing problem
(1) of constraints on the resulting line power flows. That
is, after the MOs have simultaneously and independently
solved their optimization problems (1), the resulting schedules
are assembled, the vector of bus power injections g − d is
constructed and the power flows are computed according to
(2). Then a set of constraints is communicated to the MOs, for
inclusion in their market clearing problems. These constraints
are such that they unload the lines that have been found
overloaded according to the previous bus injection schedules.
The procedure is to be repeated until a feasible equilibrium is
reached.
A central coordinator is assumed to be in operation, whose
role is to compute the constraints sent to the MOs at every
iteration. It is expected to be operated jointly by the involved
TSOs and MOs (and maybe the market participants). In
addition, TSOs are assumed to bring together the necessary
information to come up with and share the DC model (2) of the
entire interconnection. It is through this model that the central
coordinator checks the feasibility of the MOs schedules.
B. Sharing the congested transmission capacity
The approach followed in the paper makes use of the
linearity of the model (2) to decouple the line limits constraints
and share them among the several MOs in a way that preserves















pm = S(gm − dm) (7)
where gm and dm have dimensions equal to the total number
of buses in the interconnection, with zero components at
buses with no generation (respectively load) serving for (being
served by) the m-th MO.
An interpretation of (7) is that pm is the vector of line power
flows caused by the schedule of market m. This decomposition
of responsibility over the line flows is made possible by the
use of the linear DC model.
Equation (7) suggests that the power flow constraint on the
l-th line, originally expressed as
−pl ≤ pl ≤ pl ⇔ −pl ≤ Sl(g − d) ≤ pl (8)
where Sl is the l-th row vector of matrix S, can be decomposed
into:




pml = pl (9b)
So, it is suggested that for each line l found overloaded,
the central coordinator communicates to each MO a limit
pml on the power flow the MO creates in the congested line.
In other words, the central coordinator allocates some line’s
transmission capacity to every MO.
Denoting by pL the vector of line flows above limit after
an iteration k of the algorithm, the principle is that at the
k+1 iteration, the m-th MO incorporates the following set of
constraints into its market clearing problem (1):
−pmL ≤ pmL ≤ pmL (10)
The vectors pmL are computed by the central coordinator
and will reflect its congestion management policy. They are
updated at each iteration k.
C. Congestion management policy
As is well known from optimization theory [8], if the





it should allocate the transmission line capacities in such a
way that, for each congested line, the value of its use is equal
for all the MOs. Indeed, the opposite, i.e. having at least one
Authorized licensed use limited to: Thierry Van Cutsem. Downloaded on October 9, 2009 at 12:00 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
3line l for which the value λ1l for MO-1 is larger than the
value λ2l for another MO-2 would suggest that SC could be
further decreased by de-allocating some capacity from MO-2
and allocating it to MO-1.
This is what has been done in [6], in which the author
suggests that the MOs send to the central coordinator (referred
to as “master problem” in [6]) the sensitivities of their cost
functions to the line available capacities. Using this infor-
mation, for all congested lines, the coordinator shares their
available capacities among MOs so that they have the same
value for everyone of them.
However, there might be no motivation for the MOs to
compute and announce truly the values of the sensitivities
under question. On the contrary, it would be in the interest of
every MO to declare higher sensitivities since this will make
it receive more transmission capacity. This was not an issue
in [6], where the congestion management was treated as a
decentralized optimization problem, with the single objective
of minimizing the global social cost. On the contrary, the
approach followed in this paper considers the involved MOs
as competitors for the use of the transmission network (and in
the longer term for the attraction of the cheapest generators).
Their acknowledgement of the need of a coordinated operation
as well as their will to participate into a coordination scheme
are not questioned, but such a scheme should not be based
on them providing voluntarily private information just for the
sake of global optimization.
An alternative would be, at each iteration of the algorithm,
to ask the MOs to announce their prices for the use of the
congested lines. Then, the transmission capacity allocation
could be made based on these prices. Of course, the MOs
would have to pay for the use of the transmission network
according to the prices they announced. This would be an
explicit auctioning of the transmission capacity mechanism
incorporated into the iterative coordination algorithm.
The approach proposed in this paper consists in considering
that the larger the power flow a MO is causing in a trans-
mission line l, the more this line is valuable to its schedule.
Following this reasoning, the congestion management policy
consists in sharing, at each iteration k, the transmission
capacity of congested lines proportionally to their present use
by the MOs. This gives the following limit for a congested












where p(k)l is the power flow in line l after the k-th iteration
of the procedure and pm(k)l the part of this flow attributed to
the schedule of the m-th MO. It can be easily checked that
this decomposition satisfies (9b).
The same approach can be regarded from another viewpoint
as well; the more flow a MO is causing in an overloaded line,
the more this MO should participate in the alleviation.











Calling δml the change in the power flow pl caused by the
m-th MO, i.e. δml = p
m(k+1)















(pl − p(k)l ) (14)
The result is the same as if the MOs were asked to decrease
their participation pml in the power flow by a minimum amount
Δpml :







(pl − p(k)l ) (15)
thus satisfying (14).
In both viewpoints (use of constraint (13) or of (15)), the








δl ≤ pl − p(k)l (16)
The line flow is brought within its limits.
To summarize, at each iteration k of the algorithm, each













0 ≤ gm(k)i ≤ gmi (17c)
SL(gm(k) − gm(k−1)) ≤ ΔpmL (17d)
where SL the sub-matrix of S containing only the rows
corresponding to the congested transmission lines and the
vector ΔpmL is constructed according to (15).
IV. APPLICATION TO THE SIMULTANEOUS CLEARING OF
THE OVERLAPPING MARKETS
A. Test System
The iterative algorithm has been tested on a small 15-
bus system, divided into 3 areas-markets, each of which is
supposed to be cleared by a different MO (see Fig. 1). It
has been made up by triplicating a 5-bus system, connecting






































Fig. 1. 3 area test system
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4TABLE I
1ST ITERATION; GENERATION CHOSEN BY EACH MO
Gen MO-A MO-B MO-C Total
gA1 150 150 150 450
gA2 100 100 100 300
gA4 0 0 0 0
gA5 150 150 150 450
gB1 100 100 100 300
gB2 100 100 100 300
gB4 0 0 0 0
gB5 0 0 0 0
gC5 0 0 0 0
TABLE II












A1A2 17 18 18 53 100 - - -
A1A3 32 133 133 298 150 -16 -66 -66
A2A3 17 118 118 253 150 -7 -48 -48
A3A4 8 -25 175 158 400 - - -
A4A5 -50 -150 -150 -350 400 - - -
B1B2 0 0 0 0 100 - - -
B1B3 100 0 100 200 150 -25 0 -25
B2B3 100 0 100 200 150 -25 0 -25
B3B4 41 75 275 391 400 - - -
B4B5 0 100 0 100 400 - - -
C1C2 0 0 0 0 100 - - -
C1C3 0 0 -100 -100 150 - - -
C2C3 0 0 -100 -100 150 - - -
C3C4 41 -125 -125 -209 400 - - -
C4C5 0 0 100 100 400 - - -
A3B3 -159 275 75 192 200 - - -
A4C4 -41 125 325 409 200 - -58 -151
B4C3 41 -125 275 191 200 - - -
the generators, in order to create areas with cheap and others
with more expensive generation. All areas have thus the same
amount of load to serve (600 MW each).
On the diagram (Fig. 1), each area is denoted by a different
letter (A, B and C). Next to each generator, its maximum
production capacity (in MW) as well as its bid (in euros/MWh)
are shown. In order to make the evolution of the algorithm
easier to follow, each generator capacity has been divided
by three, i.e. each generator bids one third of its capacity to
every MO. For the same objective of clarity, the same bid per
generator has been placed to all the MOs. Generally, it is the
choice of each generator how much of its capacity will offer
to every market and at what price (the same generator will, in
general, bid differently to different markets).
B. Insight into the steps of the algorithm
It took 9 iterations for the algorithm to converge to a
solution. In Tables I - IV the results after the first two
iterations are presented. Some comments on the operation of
the algorithm are made referring to these results.
In Tables II and IV, the flows that result from the implemen-
tation of the generation schedules are presented. For every line,
the decomposition of its total flow into three parts is shown,
corresponding to the three MOs. Of course, the three parts
sum together to the total flow. The lines found overloaded
are pointed out using bold numbers. Also, in the last three
columns of the tables, the amount of change that each MO
TABLE III
2ND ITERATION; GENERATION CHOSEN BY EACH MO
Gen MO-A MO-B MO-C Total
gA1 125 63 0 188
gA2 100 73 100 273
gA4 75 0 0 75
gA5 150 110 0 260
gB1 75 100 75 250
gB2 75 100 75 250
gB4 0 4 149 153
gB5 0 150 150 300
gC5 0 0 51 51
TABLE IV












A1A2 9 -3 -35 -29 100 - - -
A1A3 16 67 35 118 150 4 18 10
A2A3 9 70 65 144 150 0 3 3
A3A4 -46 -43 175 86 400 - - -
A4A5 -50 -110 0 -160 400 - - -
B1B2 0 0 0 0 100 - - -
B1B3 75 0 75 150 150 0 0 0
B2B3 75 0 75 150 150 0 0 0
B3B4 21 -21 75 75 400 - - -
B4B5 0 -50 -150 -200 400 - - -
C1C2 0 0 0 0 100 - - -
C1C3 0 0 -100 -100 150 - - -
C2C3 0 0 -100 -100 150 - - -
C3C4 21 -67 -26 -72 400 - - -
C4C5 0 0 49 49 400 - - -
A3B3 -129 179 -75 -25 200 - - -
A4C4 -21 67 175 221 200 - -6 -15
B4C3 21 -67 374 328 200 -7 - -121
must at least enforce on the line flow at the next iteration is
presented. A dash (-) in this field means that the MO has no
obligation regarding the corresponding line flow when clearing
its market at the next iteration.
Once a line gets overloaded a constraint is imposed on
its flow, according to (17d). An inequality constraint remains
included in all the subsequent iterations for that line, even if
the overload is relieved. The reason for doing so is to avoid that
the line gets overloaded again in a future iteration. Therefore,
at each iteration, the constraint is updated according to the
new flow values.
The reader can ascertain that, for each line l that has
been overloaded at least once, adding together the three Δpml
corresponding to the three MOs gives a total Δpl which is
exactly equal to the difference between the present flow and
the maximum one: pl+Δpl = pl. This holds true irrespective
of whether the line is presently overloaded or not. If the line is
overloaded, the constraint distributes among the MOs the effort
to bring back the line flow within the feasible limits, while if
it is not overloaded, the constraint shares the remaining line
capacity among the MOs. In both cases the used rule keeps
the proportionality with the responsibility that each MO has
on the flow. For instance, even if the lines A1A3 and A2A3
are no longer overloaded at the 2nd iteration (see Table IV),
the corresponding constraint (17d) remains in the optimization
problem, as can be verified from the positive values of the
three Δpml in Table IV: the MOs can now use the remaining
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5TABLE V
FINAL POINT; GENERATION CHOSEN BY EACH MO
Gen bid MO-A MO-B MO-C Total
gA1 5 134 99 17 250
gA2 4 96 59 95 250
gA4 15 94 0 0 94
gA5 8 150 80 0 230
gB1 11 26 100 124 250
gB2 10 100 100 50 250
gB4 20 0 12 0 12
gB5 18 0 150 114 264
gC1 30 0 0 28 28
gC2 30 0 0 100 100
gC4 40 0 0 0 0
gC5 35 0 0 72 72
available capacity of the line, but to a limited extent so that
the line remains within its limits.
Taking a look in Table II, one can see that for the tie-line
A4C4, MO-A is not attributed any constraint at all, even if
the line is overloaded. All the effort is shared between MO-
B and MO-C (indeed ΔpBl + ΔpCl = pl − pl). MO-A is
allowed to cause whatever change on the line flow at the next
iteration. The reason is that MO-A is creating a counterflow
on the line. Indeed, it is deemed more fair and efficient not
to apply a constraint to the MOs causing a counterflow on a
congested line. The change needed is shared among the other
MOs, assuming that the counterflowing ones will continue
to counterflow by the same amount. If this turns out not to
happen, a new constraint will be applied to the MO at the
next iteration of the algorithm.
In this respect, it is interesting to see why line A4C4
remained overloaded after the 2nd iteration, while the other
four overloaded ones (lines A1A3, A2A3, B1B3 and B2B3)
all came back within their limits. One can see that the line
remained overloaded by an amount p(2)l − pl = 21MW =
p
A(2)
l − pA(1)l , that is to say by the amount that MO-A
decreased its counterflowing contribution. MO-A decreased
its contribution because it was obliged to do so in order to
satisfy its constraints (relative to lines A1A3, A2A3, B1B3
and B2B3). In fact, when all MOs are assigned responsibility
for an overload (no one counterflows), then, at the next step,
the line will for sure be unloaded, since (9b) holds true.
On the contrary, when at least one MO is counterflowing
an overloaded line, then it is possible that the line remains
overloaded at the next step. Even a non-overloaded line may
become overloaded if there is one (or more) MO that is
counterflowing. However, this does not really cause a problem;
these calculations are nothing but intermediate steps of a
process which converges to the sought operating point. At the
end of the procedure no line remains overloaded.
In Tables V and VI the generation schedules and the flows
at the final equilibrium point (to be actually implemented) are
presented. No line is overloaded at this point. Lines A1A3,
A2A3, B1B3, B2B3, A4C4 and B4C3 are fully used. It is
interesting to mention that these are the lines that, from the
first steps of the algorithm, turned out to be the most crucial
for the satisfaction of the most economic generation schedules.
It is also noteworthy that MO-A finally manages to allocate
TABLE VI












A1A2 13 14 -27 0 100 - - -
A1A3 21 85 44 150 150 0 0 0
A2A3 9 73 68 150 150 0 0 0
A3A4 -57 -21 154 76 400 - - -
A4A5 -50 -80 0 -130 400 - - -
B1B2 -26 0 26 0 100 - - -
B1B3 52 0 98 150 150 0 0 0
B2B3 74 0 76 150 150 0 0 0
B3B4 14 -21 131 124 400 - - -
B4B5 0 -50 -114 -164 400 - - -
C1C2 0 0 -25 -25 100 - - -
C1C3 0 0 -47 -47 150 - - -
C2C3 0 0 -25 -25 150 - - -
C3C4 14 -59 -27 -72 400 - - -
C4C5 0 0 28 28 400 - - -
A3B3 -112 178 -42 24 200 - - -
A4C4 -14 60 154 200 200 - 0 0
B4C3 14 -60 246 200 200 0 - 0
mainly the less expensive generators (located geographically
in its area), while on the other hand, MO-C is mostly obliged
to resort to some expensive generators (geographically located
in its own area). This makes sense since MO-C is the main
responsible for loading the tie-lines A4C4 and B4C3, and,
consequently, it is the one who is mainly assigned the effort
for unloading.
C. Evaluation of the results
Table VII presents the generation schedules that result from
a global market clearing for the entire interconnection. The
following optimization problem was solved, including all areas













0 ≤ gmi ≤ gmi (18c)
−p ≤ S(g − d) ≤ p (18d)
The vectors g and d are given by Eq. (3) and (4). It should
be noted that (18b) contains three equality constraints, each
one preserving the power balance of an MO m. Thus, the
schedules presented in Table VII are globally optimal, given
the generator decisions of where to bid.
In Table VIII the resulting costs are shown. For the m-th







with i corresponding to all the generators that are producing
for the MO m.
Three individual market clearings, without cross region bid-
ding, in which each MO considers only the generators located
in its area were also performed for comparison. To do so, three
optimization problems were solved, one for each area, each of
them referring only to variables and constraints geographically
Authorized licensed use limited to: Thierry Van Cutsem. Downloaded on October 9, 2009 at 12:00 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
6TABLE VII
GLOBAL MARKET CLEARING
Gen bid MO-A MO-B MO-C Total
gA1 5 150 50 50 250
gA2 4 100 100 50 250
gA4 15 0 0 0 0
gA5 8 150 150 0 300
gB1 11 0 100 150 250
gB2 10 50 100 100 250
gB4 20 0 0 0 0
gB5 18 150 0 150 300
gC1 30 0 0 0 0
gC2 30 0 100 100 200
gC4 40 0 0 0 0
gC5 35 0 0 0 0
located within the area. As a result, the generators of each area
produce all together exactly the amount of the area’s total load.
By chance no line got overloaded. However this could happen
in general, since no area considers the effect of its schedule
on the other areas.
TABLE VIII
COSTS COMPARISON
Cost: MO-A MO-B MO-C Total
global clearing 5550 6950 8800 21300
proposed iter. algorithm 4950 6412 10740 22102
independent clearing 3050 7050 18500 28600
The proposed iterative algorithm is not equivalent to solving
the global problem (18) and, thus, the resulting schedules are
not globally optimal (see last column of Table VIII).
In fact, the proposed algorithm allows cross market bidding
while, first, respecting the individuality of each market (no
global market clearing is attempted) and, second, managing
the resulting congestion according to a specific policy (as
described in Section III). This policy is highlighted by com-
paring the individual MOs costs resulting from the iterative
algorithm and the global clearing (first two rows in Table
VIII, columns 2-4); in the global clearing the total cost has
been minimized by obtaining a significantly lower cost for
MO-C even if the costs of MOs A and B were higher than
in the iterative algorithm. This difference reflects the fact
that MO-C, during the execution of the iterative algorithm,
has to deallocate generation from areas A and B in order to
alleviate the congestion of the tie-lines for which it is mainly
responsible.
Nonetheless, the total social cost resulting from the iter-
ative algorithm (22102 euros) is just 3.76% higher than the
minimum social cost (21300 euros) that can be obtained and
significantly lower (29.4%) than the social cost resulting from
the independent market clearings (28600 euros). This shows
that the congestion management policy used in this paper goes
with the objective of dispatching as much as possible the
cheapest generators, while in the same time preserving the
independency of the different markets.
V. CONCLUSION
The possibility of allowing external actors to bid in what-
ever market of an interconnection has been investigated in
this paper. The situation has been modeled as the existence
of several overlapping markets. An iterative algorithm that
permits a simultaneous clearing of all markets and leads to
feasible schedules has been proposed. The algorithm has been
illustrated on a test system allowing to highlight some of its
attractive features.
Based on the credible (at least in Europe) assumptions of
sharing a common model of the interconnection and making
use of a “neutral” coordinating entity (performing, practically,
just some central computations), the presented algorithm is
easy to implement and beneficial for the goal of moving
towards a common electricity market from the participants
perspective. As to the first, only a small set of linear constraints
are communicated to the MOs and can be easily incorporated
into their market clearing procedures. Regarding the second,
market participants can freely choose the MO of their pref-
erence; this can be based on a combination of criteria, like
expected prices, different financial or IT tools, favoring of
clean energies and other.
Within this paper, a small test system has been chosen as
an example to draw the reader’s attention on the features of
the algorithm. However, the algorithm should easily scale up
to large systems; only a few lines are expected to tend to get
congested. Preliminary tests with the 3-area IEEE RTS-196,
to be reported shortly, have also resulted in fast convergence
(less than 10 iterations in all cases).
In the presented algorithm, every generator decides a priori
how much of its available capacity will offer to each market.
This may result in generation capacity not been finally allo-
cated by any MO even if it would be useful to some of them.
An interesting extension will be to allow shifting generation
capacity from one market to another during the execution of
the algorithm.
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